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| Author: | Bhardwaj, P. |
| Title: | Delegating Pricing Decisions |
| Journal: | Marketing Science
2001 : VOL. 20:2, p. 143-169 |
| Index terms: | PRICING COMPETITION DELEGATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and, in turn, the impact of delegation on prices and incentives. The theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions: prices and (sales agents') effort. Specifically, we are interested in answering the following questions: (1) Does competition affect the price-delegation decision and, if yes, why? (2) How do prices vary under price-delegation and no-price- delegation scenarios? (3) Do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no-delegation scenarios. To address these issues, the authors build a game-theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives. |
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