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| Author: | Foss, N. J. |
| Title: | Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization |
| Journal: | Organization Science
2003 : MAY-JUN, VOL. 14:3, p. 331-349 |
| Index terms: | ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE DELEGATION COMMITMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper argues that "internal hybrids," particularly in their radical forms, are inherently hard to successfully design and implement because of a fundamental incentive problem of establishing credible managerial commitments to not intervene in delegated decision making. Author states that an organizational economics interpretation of Oticon organizational changes is developed. A strong liability of the spaghetti organization was the above incentive problem: Frequent managerial meddling with delegated rights led to a severe loss of motivation, and arguably caused the change to a more structured organization. Refutable implications are developed, and the discussion is broadened to more general issues of economic organization. |
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