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| Author: | Roulstone, D. T. |
| Title: | The Relation between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting Research
2003 : JUN, VOL. 41: 3, p. 525-552 |
| Index terms: | INSIDER TRADING EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this study the author investigates the relation between firm-level insider-trading restrictions and executive compensation. The author finds that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive-based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives. |
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