search query: @indexterm ARBITRAGE / total: 72
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| Author: | Homburg, S. |
| Title: | An analysis of the German Protection Law |
| Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1993 : JUN, VOL. 149, p. 464-474 |
| Index terms: | WELFARE CONTROL GERMANY LAW ARBITRAGE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The welfare consequences of eviction control, combined with consecutive rent control, are investigated in this article. The authors think that any evaluation of eviction control must take into account the fact that tenants do not voluntarily demand protection from eviction. According to their interpretation, tenants do not highly value protection from eviction because the objective probability of arbitrary eviction is small. In this view, the tenants' short-run utility from unanticipated legal eviction control appears to be small whereas the long-run costs may be substantial. |
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