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Author:Li, F.
Srinivasan, S.
Title:Corporate governance when founders are directors
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2011 : NOV, VOL. 102:2, p. 454-469
Index terms:chief executive officers
corporate governance
directors
stocks
rate of return
incentives
consolidation
compensation
Language:eng
Abstract:We study chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms whose founders work as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). Founder-director firms are found to offer a different incentives mix to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher and pay level is lower for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms than those of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also substantially higher in founder-director firms compared to nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence indicates that boards with founder-directors offer higher-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US boards. Also stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are higher in founder-director firms compared to nonfounder firms.
SCIMA record nr: 275985
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