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| Author: | Mayhew, B. W. Schatzberg, J. W. Sevcik, G. R. |
| Title: | The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Objectivity |
| Journal: | Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory
2001 : SEP, VOL. 20:2, p. 49-70 |
| Index terms: | ACCOUNTING UNCERTAINTY AUDITORS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors conducted an "experimental economic markets" study. In these markets, students take the roles of managers, auditors, and investors in buying and selling assets and audit services. To capture the economic incentives present in real markets, students receive cash payments based on their earnings in the markets. The authors employ two variations in our markets. In the first, auditors receive precise information about an asset their client wishes to sell. The asset is analogous to shares of stock sold in the market place. The authors make the simple assumption that managers directly benefit from the selling price of the asset. In the second, auditors receive imprecise but objective information about the asset their client wishes to sell. |
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