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| Author: | Sinclair-Desgagne, B. Gozlan, E. |
| Title: | A theory of environmental risk disclosure |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2003 : MAR, VOL. 45:2S, p. 377-393 |
| Index terms: | ENVIRONMENT REPORTS GAMES INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The regulation of environmental risks increasingly emphasizes the awareness and empowerment of stakeholders. The success of this approach, however, seems to depend crucially on the quality of environmental disclosures. In this paper the authors investigate the amount and quality of the information that would be voluntarily delivered to some stakeholder by a potential polluter. The authors find that information may be hazier when the stakeholder is confident (or naive) a priori, the cost of analyzing the received reports increases little with their complexity, or a polluter's net expected payoff from undertaking an industrial activity that would turn out to be unsafe is small. A worried stakeholder and a low cost of producing more accurate figures, on the other hand, favor disclosure of high-quality information. |
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