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Author:Nafziger, J.
Title:Motivational job assignments
Journal:Economica
2011 : OCT, VOL 78: 312 p. 676-695
Index terms:employee motivation
bonus systems
incentives
job enrichment
motivation
Freeterms:self-efficacy
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper considers how a company combines bonus payments with job assignments (through which it influences an employee's self-efficacy) to provide incentives. We show that companies utilize the inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the employee's self-efficacy. The higher the employee's self-efficacy, the higher his work motivation and hence the lower the bonus the company has to pay. Thus distortions in the job assignment lead to lower production, but savings in the wage bill. This finding provides justification for why companies do not separate job assignments from the provision of incentives.
SCIMA record nr: 274985
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