search query: @journal_id 97 / total: 799
reference: 81 / 799
| Author: | Jehiel, P. |
| Title: | Limited foresight may force cooperation |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
2001 : APR, VOL. 68:2(235), p. 369-391 |
| Index terms: | CO-OPERATION GAMES |
| Freeterms: | LIMITED FORESIGHT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming ni action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind, which is non-deterministic. A limited forecast equilibrium is such that after every history the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct. |
SCIMA