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| Author: | Ishiguro, S. Itoh, H. |
| Title: | Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
2001 : JAN, VOL. 68:1(234), p. 1-20 |
| Index terms: | CONTRACTS NEGOTIATION |
| Freeterms: | MULTIPLE AGENTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. The authors show that renegotiation with multiple agents reduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile down to the first-best level, even though the principal cannot observe the agents' actions. |
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