search query: @author Röller, L-H. / total: 8
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| Author: | Neven, D.J. Röller, L-H. |
| Title: | The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
2000 : MAY, VOL. 44:4-6, p. 845-855 |
| Index terms: | Competition Policy Mergers Control International Models |
| Freeterms: | Jurisdiction |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the organisation of international antitrust as issue of institution design which involves a trade-off btw. inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. It is focused on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control. It is first pointed out that the current framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction. Then considered are various allocations of jurisdictions in stylized model of international merger control. It is found that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue. There are also more findings reported. |
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