search query: @author Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. / total: 8
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| Author: | Chakraborty, I. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. |
| Title: | Corners in auctions |
| Journal: | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
2001 : SUMMER, VOL. 10:2, p. 265-276 |
| Index terms: | AUCTIONS PRICING |
| Freeterms: | CORNERING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Different pricing rules in multiunit auctions provide different incentives for a bidder to corner the auction and thus require different levels of effort from the seller to deter cornering. The authors consider three different types of auctions: the pay-your-bid or "discriminatory" auction commonly used by the US Treasury, the lowest-winning-bid uniform-price auction used in the current Treasury experiment, and the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction considered by Vickery almost four decades ago. |
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