search query: @author Suarez, J. / total: 8
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Author: | Almazan, A. Suarez, J. |
Title: | Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures |
Journal: | Journal of Finance
2003 : APR, VOl. 58:2. p. 519-547 |
Index terms: | Chief executive officers Compensation Corporate governance Severance payments |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his/her management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the CEO's compensation package and on the CEO's influence on the board of directors regarding hiw own replacement. The authors explain when and why the combination of some degree of entrechment and a sizeable severance package is desirable. |
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