search query: @author Epple, D. / total: 8
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| Author: | Calabrese, S. Epple, D. Romani, R. |
| Title: | On the political economy of zoning |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : FEB, VOL. 91:1-2, p. 25-49 |
| Index terms: | public goods voting |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Households collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good when they choose a community in a metropol area. This artcle shows computationally that zoning restitrictions are likely to be strengthen stringent equilibrium, zoning causes Tiebout-welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers. It also claims that relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning, the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing-market distortions. |
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