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Author: | Calabrese, S. Epple, D. Romani, R. |
Title: | On the political economy of zoning |
Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : FEB, VOL. 91:1-2, p. 25-49 |
Index terms: | public goods voting |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | Households collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good when they choose a community in a metropol area. This artcle shows computationally that zoning restitrictions are likely to be strengthen stringent equilibrium, zoning causes Tiebout-welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers. It also claims that relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning, the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing-market distortions. |
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