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Author:Kempf, A.
Ruenzi, S.
Thiele, T.
Title:Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: evidence from the mutual fund industry
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2009 : APR, VOL 92:1, p. 92-108
Index terms:risk
compensation
funds
USA
Language:eng
Abstract:The article studies how the incentives resulting from employment risk and compensation affect managerial risk taking. An empirical analysis is conducted using data gathered from three US databases. The results suggest that managerial risk taking depends on the relative importance of the above mentioned incentives. When employment risk is relevant, managers with a poor midyear performance seem to decrease risk. In turn, when the compensation incentive is relevant these kind of fund managers increase the risk.
SCIMA record nr: 272896
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