search query: @author Lang, L. H. P. / total: 8
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| Author: | Lang, L. H. P. Stulz, R. M. Walking, R. A. |
| Title: | Managerial performance, Tobin's q, and the gains from successful tender offers |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1989 : SEP, VOL. 24:1, p. 137-154 |
| Index terms: | MANAGERS JOB PERFORMANCE TENDER OFFERS SHAREHOLDERS MERGERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | For a sample of successful tender offers, it is found that the shareholders of high q bidders gain significantly more than the shareholders of low q bidders. In general, the shareholders of low q targets benefit more from takeovers then the shareholders of high q targets. Typical bidders have persistently low q ratios prior to the acquisition announcement while target q ratios decline over the five years before the tender offer. The results support the view that takeovers of poorly managed targets by well-managed bidders have higher bidder , target, and total gains. |
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