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| Author: | Borokhovich, K. A. Brunarski, K. R. Parrino, R. |
| Title: | CEO contracting and antitakeover amendments |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
1997 : SEP, VOL. 52:4, p. 1495-1517 |
| Index terms: | CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS CONTRACTS BIDDING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates CEO compensation contracts for evidence on the motivations underlying the adoption of antitakeover charter amendments. Evidence regarding the ability of the firms with antitakeover charter amendments (ATA) to deter takeover bids is first examined. The evidence indicates that ATAs are generally adopted at the beginning of a concerted effort to deter takeovers. These efforts seem to be successful because firms that adopt ATAs receive fewer takeover bids than do control firms in the three years subsequent to the ATA's adoption. From compensation contracts the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover amendments are adopted to entrench managers. |
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