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| Author: | Abbring, J. H. Chiappori, P.-A. Pinquet, J. |
| Title: | Moral hazard and dynamic insurance data |
| Journal: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2003 : JUN, VOL. 1:4, p. 767-820 |
| Index terms: | Information economics Moral hazard Insurance companies Car industry Contracts France |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors show that experience rating implies negative occurence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. They then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinuish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. They find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. |
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