search query: @author Dye, R. A. / total: 9
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| Author: | Dye, R. A. |
| Title: | Relative performance evaluation and project selection |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting Research
1992 : SPRING, VOL. 30, p. 27-52 |
| Index terms: | ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PROJECTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper illustrates how the benefits of relative performance evaluation based schemes (RPE) depend on the absence of project choice decisions in the canonical agency model. The results demonstrate that gains achievable from RPE vary nonmonotonically with the number of industries or projects to which the agent has access. When an agent has limited discretion in project choice, the author shows analytically that, when the agent has access to a sufficiently large array of projects, RPE is as effective in reducing the moral hazard problem between the principal and agent as when the agent has no project choice. |
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