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Author:Anderson, M.
Kanatas, G.
Title:Asymmetric information, dividends, and external financing
Journal:Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
1995 : SEP, VOL. 5:3, p. 271-290
Index terms:DIVIDENDS
INVESTORS
INCENTIVES
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors analyze a signaling game where firms' dividend announcements convey private information but the possible need to externally finance the dividend creates an incentive conflict between inside and outside investors. Consequently, the attempt to address an adverse selection problem creates (or exacerbates) moral hazard. The interaction of these two imperfect information problems results in equilibria that may be separating or pooling.
SCIMA record nr: 139383
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