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Author:Cox, J.
Title:Moral hazard and adverse selection in procurement contracting
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : DEC, VOL. 17:2, p. 147-176
Index terms:ECONOMICS
GAMES
ADVERSE SELECTION
Language:eng
Abstract:A model of procurement contracting is developed and tested in laboratory experiments. Market performance results are presented for both fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts. Contracts are awarded with first-price sealed-bid or second-price sealed bid auctions. The environment contains post-auction cost uncertainty and opportunity for unmonitored effort in contract cost reduction. Cost-sharing contracts are found to reduce procurement expense but also to be inefficient because of their induced moral hazard waste and cost overruns.
SCIMA record nr: 155744
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