search query: @author Cooper, R. / total: 94
reference: 7 / 94
| Author: | Cooper, R. Ross, T. W. |
| Title: | Bank runs: deposit insurance and capital requirements |
| Journal: | International Economic Review
2002 : FEB, VOL. 43:1, p. 55-72 |
| Index terms: | Bank deposits Capital Financial risk Insurance |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors extend the Diamond-Dybvig model (J. of Pol. Econ. 1983) to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. They find that complete deposit insureance alone will not support the first-best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. An additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first-best allocation. |
SCIMA