search query: @indexterm CREDIT MARKETS / total: 99
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| Author: | Kürsten, A. |
| Title: | Zur Anreiz-Inkompatibilität von Kreditsicherheiten oder: Insuffizienz des Stiglitz/Weiss-Modells der Agency-Theorie |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1997 : VOL. 49:10, p. 819-857 |
| Index terms: | CREDIT CREDIT MARKETS LITERATURE AGENCY THEORY SECURITY MODELS |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | The paper deals with the role of collateral in credit markets under imperfect information. In the literature , a positive role of collateral is deduced from its use as an incentive compatible mechanism to cope with problems of debt-induced moral hazard. While the assertion that collateral mitigates Myers' underinvestment problem can be validated, in the context of Jensen/Mecklings asset substitution problem collateral exhibits both positive and negative incentive effects. With both agency problems existing simultaneously, collateral can aggravate the agency costs of double moral hazard even if its impact is positive under both agency problems in isolation. There is also no general positive role of (costly) collateralization in credit market equilibrium under asymmetric information. |
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