search query: @journal_id 68 / total: 997
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| Author: | Perkins, S.J. Hendry, C. |
| Title: | Ordering top pay: Interpreting the signals |
| Journal: | Journal of Management Studies
2005 : NOV, VOL. 42:7, p. 1443-1468 |
| Index terms: | pay reward systems top management |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the relation between executive management and firm performance. It is argued, that the causality between them has been overestimated in the literature. Interpretations of comparative marketing signals plays an important role in deliberations between the leading actors responsible for determining executive directors' salary, bonuses and other emoluments. Non-executive directors act as intermediaries in the principal-agent relationship, explicitly assigned to solve the conflict of interest inherent in boardroom remuneration systems, while simultaneously they are expected to play a team role as board members responsible for the overall strategy and operation of the company. |
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