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| Author: | Peng, L. Röell, A. |
| Title: | Executive pay and shareholder litigation |
| Journal: | Review of finance
2008 : VOL. 12:1, p. 141-184 |
| Index terms: | executive remuneration managers incentives compensation pay shareholders litigation |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper explores the impact of executive compensation (hereafter as: compn.) on private securities (here as: secs.) litigation (as: litgn). It is found that incentive pay in the form of options increases the probability of secs. class action litgn., holding constant a wide range of firm characteristics etc. The results suggest that option-based compn. may have the unintended side effect of giving executives an incentive to focus excessively on the short term share price. |
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