search query: @indexterm GAME THEORY / total: 415
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| Author: | Hakli, R. Miller, K. Tuomela, R. |
| Title: | Two kinds of we-reasoning |
| Journal: | Economics and philosophy
2010 : NOV, VOL. 26:3, p. 291-320 |
| Index terms: | economics game theory philosophy theories models |
| Freeterms: | reasoning |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study deals with a particular approach to the 'we-reasoning', that is, economist Michael Bacharach's (here as: B.) theory of 'team reasoning'. It is related to philosopher Raimo Tuomela's (here as: T.) distinction btw. 'I-mode' reasoning (here as: rsng.) and 'we-mode' rsng. These theories are argued to complement each other: T.'s philosophical theory provides a conceptual framework augmenting B.'s theory, and B.'s mathematical results support T.'s view on the irreducibility of the we-mode to the I-mode. We-mode rsng. can explain some kinds of human cooperative behaviour left unexplained by standard game theory (here as: s-g-t.). S-g-t. is not well-equipped to deal with we-mode rsng. but it can be extended by the methods developed by B. However, it is argued that both s-g-t. and B.'s theory require more attention to the information-sharing stages preceding actual decision making. A stage-based model of 'we-reasoning' is described. |
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