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| Author: | Hubert, F. Ikonnikova, S. |
| Title: | Investment options and bargaining power: the Eurasian supply chain for natural gas |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2011 : MAR, VOL. 59:1, p. 85-116 |
| Index terms: | investment options bargaining game theory empirical research supply chain natural gas Belarus Ukraine Russia |
| Freeterms: | gas industry |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Cooperative game theory is used to analyze the power structure in the Russian gas pipeline network. If the focus of the assessment is narrow, concentrating on the abilities to obstruct flows in the present system, the main transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, appear to be strong. However, when investment options are taken into account, Russia achieves clear dominance. Competition between transit countries has little strategic relevance in comparison to Russia's direct access to its customers. Assessing our theoretical results in the light of empirical evidence, the Shapley value is found to explain the power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus. |
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