haku: @supervisor Asokan, N. / yhteensä: 11
viite: 3 / 11
Tekijä: | Pereida Garcia, Cesar |
Työn nimi: | Cache-Timing Techniques: Exploiting the DSA Algorithm |
Julkaisutyyppi: | Diplomityö |
Julkaisuvuosi: | 2016 |
Sivut: | (8) + 70 Kieli: eng |
Koulu/Laitos/Osasto: | Perustieteiden korkeakoulu |
Oppiaine: | (SCI3071) |
Valvoja: | Asokan, N. ; Unruh, Dominique |
Ohjaaja: | Brumley, Billy |
Elektroninen julkaisu: | http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-201608263035 |
Sijainti: | P1 Ark Aalto 5407 | Arkisto |
Avainsanat: | applied cryptography cache-timing attacks side-channel analysis digital signatures DSA OpenSSL |
Tiivistelmä (eng): | Side-channel information is any type of information leaked through unexpected channels due to physical features of a system dealing with data. The memory cache can be used as a side-channel, leakage and exploitation of side-channel information from the executing processes is possible, leading to the recovery of secret information. Cache-based side-channel attacks represent a serious threat to implementations of several cryptographic primitives, especially in shared libraries. This work explains some of the cache-timing techniques commonly used to exploit vulnerable software. Using a particular combination of techniques and exploiting a vulnerability found in the implementation of the DSA signature scheme in the OpenSSL shared library, a cache-timing attack is performed against the DSA's sliding window exponentiation algorithm. Moreover, the attack is expanded to show that it is possible to perform cache-timing attacks against protocols relying on the DSA signature scheme. SSH and TLS are attacked, leading to a key-recovery attack: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA hostkey from an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a 2048/256-bit DSA key from an stunnel server. |
ED: | 2016-09-04 |
INSSI tietueen numero: 54247
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