Tekijä:Schoppa, L. J.
Otsikko:Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why gaiatsu succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others.
Lehti:International Organization
1993 : SUMMER, VOL. 47:3, p. 353-386
Asiasana:BARGAINING
NEGOTIATION
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
STRATEGY
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:One of the strengths of Robert Putnam's two-level bargaining game model is its ability to capture how international negotiations make it possible for negotiators to pursue synergistic strategies aimed at improving their prospects for a favorable deal by reshaping politics in both their own and their counterparts' domestic arenas. While reaffirming the utility of this approach, this article argues that Putnam describes only some of the synergistic strategies available to negotiators.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 107877
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