Tekijä:Ireland, N.
Otsikko:The provision of information in a Bertrand oligopoly
Lehti:Journal of Industrial Economics
1993 : MAR, VOL. 41:1, p. 61-76
Asiasana:INFORMATION
OLIGOPOLY
CONSUMERS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:A 2-stage model of a homogenious good oligopoly is constructed which is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found which is characterized by less than full information and by positive expected profits. An alternative interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders will be made.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 108154
lisää koriin
SCIMA