| Tekijä: | Cheung, S. Krinzky, I. |
| Otsikko: | Information asymmetry and the underpricing of initial public offerings: further empirical evidence |
| Lehti: | Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1994 : JUL, VOL. 21:5, p. 739-747 |
| Asiasana: | INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwrite is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investor banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. |
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