| Tekijä: | Wang, C. |
| Otsikko: | Dynamic insurance with private information and balanced budgets |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1995 : OCT, VOL. 62(4):213, p. 577-596 |
| Asiasana: | INSURANCE PRIVACY INFORMATION BUDGET |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper studies a dynamic insurance problem with bilateral asymmetric information and balanced budgets. There are two infinitely-lived agents in our model, both risk averse, and each has an i.i.d. random endowment stream which is unobservable to the other. In each period, each agent must have a non-negative consumption and together they must consume the entire aggregate endowment. Dynamic incentive compatibility in the Nash sense is defined. The author gives sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a constrained efficient contract. |
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