Tekijä:Kara, T.
Sonmez, T.
Otsikko:Nash implementation of matching rules
Lehti:Journal of Economic Theory
1996 : FEB, VOL. 68:2, p. 425-439
Asiasana:IMPLEMENTATION
MATCHING PROBLEM
ECONOMICS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors consider the Nash implementation of Paeto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems. The authors show that all such rules are supersolutions in the context of matching problems. The authors show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these solutions, the authors show that the "lower bound" stable rule and the 'upper bound" Pareto and individually rational rule are Nash implementable. The proofs of these results are by means of a recent technique developed by Danilov.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 148197
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