| Tekijä: | Neeman, Z. |
| Otsikko: | Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : SEP, VOL. 16:1, p. 77-96 |
| Asiasana: | SPECULATION TRADE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's notion of common p-belief and show that when traders entertain doubts about the rationality of other traders, arbitrarily large volumes of trade as well as rationality may be common p-belief for a large p. Furthermore, rationality and trade may simultaneously be known to arbitrary large (but finite) degree. |
SCIMA