| Tekijä: | Vollebergh, H. |
| Otsikko: | Hybrid carbon incentive mechanisms and political acceptability |
| Lehti: | Environmental and Resource Economics
1997 : JAN, VOL. 9:1, p. 43-63 |
| Asiasana: | ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS INCENTIVES ECONOMICS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. |
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