| Tekijä: | Waller, C. Walsh, C. |
| Otsikko: | Central-Bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term lengths |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1996 : DEC, VOL. 86:5, p. 1139-1153 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS AMERICA BANKING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors parametrize central-bank independence in terms of partisanship and term length, and they focus on the implications of alternative policy structures for real economic activity. While long terms of office for the central banker can reduce the role of electoral surprises, term lengths that are two long are costly is societal preferences are subject to permanent shifts. The appointment of a conservative central banker increases the optimal term length and leads to lower average inflation but need not increase the volatility of output. |
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