| Tekijä: | Sung, J. |
| Otsikko: | Corporate insurance and managerial incentives |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1997 : JUN, VOL. 74:2, p. 297-332 |
| Asiasana: | COMPANIES INSURANCE INCENTIVES MANAGERIAL ACTIVITIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Corporate insurance can be useful to improve the efficiency of a managerial contract under managerial moral hazard, when a manager performs multiple tasks to control the expected number of accidents. It is assumed that investors can observe occurrences and insurance settlements of all accidents. The managerial contracting problem which does not exist in individual insurance can make corporate insurance attractive. Investors can use two performance measures, losses from insured accidents and losses from uninsured accidents, by insuring only some types of accidents. |
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