| Tekijä: | Konishi, H. Le Breton, M. Weber, S. |
| Otsikko: | Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1998 : APR, VOL. 79:2, p. 224-244 |
| Asiasana: | EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PUBLIC GOODS MODELS THEORIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper examines the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax. It is shown that under a proportional income tax scheme a Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but, in general. Nash equilibria violate a very weak efficiency condition. The paper is concluded by commenting on the zoning policies' stabilizing effect. |
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