| Tekijä: | Tucker, R. Matsumura, E. |
| Otsikko: | Going concern judgments: an economic perspective |
| Lehti: | Behavioral Research in Accounting
1998 : VOL. 10:1, p. 179-217 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS RESEARCH INCENTIVES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This research examines the effects of economic incentives on the strategic interaction between an auditor and client when a potential going concern situation exists. This experimental economics investigation has the following game structure. The auditor first obtains information relevant in predicting the client's viability and then conveys to the client an intention to express a clean or going concern opinion. A client can switch auditors in an attempt to avoid a going concern opinion and the potential self-fulfilling nature of the auditor's prediction of business termination. |
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