| Tekijä: | Bucovetsky, S. |
| Otsikko: | Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure |
| Lehti: | Journal of Urban Economics
1998 : NOV, VOL. 44:3, p. 367-390 |
| Asiasana: | URBAN AREAS ECONOMICS TAXATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. |
SCIMA