Tekijä:Janeba, E.
Peters, W.
Otsikko:Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination: The case of interest taxation in Europe
Lehti:Economic Journal
1999 : JAN, VOL. 109:452, p. 93-101
Asiasana:Economic theory
Game theory
Models
Tax evasion
Competition
Europe
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In the paper, a game-theoretic approach is used to analyze the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows the success of various reform proposals to get assessed. It is argued that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non-cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate, but in equilibrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, tax competition leads to less tax evasion.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 185860
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