| Tekijä: | Noe, T. |
| Otsikko: | Rationalizable and coalition proof shareholder tendering strategies in corporate takeovers |
| Lehti: | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
1998 : NOV, VOL. 11:3, p. 269-291 |
| Asiasana: | FINANCE ACCOUNTING MERGERS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | his paper determines the set of rational responses by shareholders to unconditional takeover offers at prices between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition price of the firm. Two cases are considered. In the first case, coordination across shareholders is not presumed. In the second case, the set of strategies consistent with coordination through preplay communication, the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whisnston, 1987) are analyzed. |
SCIMA