Tekijä: | Brookfield, D. Ormrod, P. |
Otsikko: | Executive stock options: volatility, managerial decisions and agency costs |
Lehti: | Journal of Multinational Financial Management
2000 : SEP-DEC, VOL. 10:3/4, p. 275-296 |
Asiasana: | FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT RISK VOLATILITY |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | This paper proposes a new rationale for understanding managerial contracts which set-out to induce stock price volatility in the form of granting of executive stock options. First, the authors suggest that previous research focuses too much on short term volatility effects and offering neither a theoretical or empirical perspective on incentives which might influence long-term behavior. To address this, the authors offer a theoretical structure of why managerial incentives might be important in determining the evolution of volatility over the life of an option contract and provide empirical support for their views. |
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