Tekijä:Amir, R.
Jin, J. Y.
Otsikko:Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity
Lehti:International Journal of Industrial Organization
2001 : MAR, VOL. 19:3-4, p. 303-317
Asiasana:PRODUCTS
OLIGOPOLY
COMPETITION
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper assesses the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than Cournot equilibrium. The authors consider an oligopoly model with linear demand, and a mixture of substitute and complementary products. The authors' results provide support for the conventional wisdom, and also indicate its limitations. The authors provide counter-examples showing that no clear-cut comparison of prices and quantities is possible without strategic complementarity in either of the two games. However, price competition is indeed more competitive according to the following criteria: lower mark-up/output ratios, larger average output, and lower average price.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 224815
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