| Tekijä: | Kraft, K. |
| Otsikko: | Codetermination as a strategic advantage? |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2001 : MAR, VOL. 19:3-4, p. 543-566 |
| Asiasana: | CO-DETERMINATION STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT MODELS THEORIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A theoretical model of codetermination is considered, where consistent with German institutions, firm owners bargain with employees' representatives about employment but not about wages. A duopoly and a more general oligopolistic situation are analysed. For some range of bargaining power a prisoner's dilemma exists. Codetermination leads to increased profits if the other firm is a traditional profit maximizer. Bargaining is the dominant strategy, although joint profits would be maximized with unrestricted profit-maximization. The theory is tested with data from 22 German firms, who operate in the same markets over 23 years. Codetermined firms actually show a different behaviour than other companies. |
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