| Tekijä: | Demougin, D. Fluet, C. |
| Otsikko: | Monitoring versus incentives |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
2001 : OCT, VOL. 45:9, p. 1741-1764 |
| Asiasana: | AGENCY THEORY INCENTIVES MORAL HAZARD |
| Vapaa asiasana: | MONITORING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper analyzes the trade-off between monitoring and incentives in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. The authors derive general results on the optimal monitoring - incentives mix for the case where both parties are risk-neutral and the agent faces a limited liability constraint. They show that the principal uses less monitoring and stronger incentives if the agent's liability limit is relaxed or if monitoring costs increase. |
SCIMA