| Tekijä: | Diermeier, D. Eraslan, H. Merlo, A. |
| Otsikko: | Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
2002 : APR, VOL. 46:4-5, p. 893-907 |
| Asiasana: | Legislation Models |
| Vapaa asiasana: | Stability Constitution Political science |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper presents a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which used to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. The methodology is illustrated by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design. |
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