Tekijä:Fridolfsson, S.-O.
Stennek, J.
Otsikko:Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices - a theory of preemptive mergers
Lehti:Journal of the European Economic Association
2005 : SEP, VOL. 3:5, p. 1083-1104
Asiasana:mergers
profit
share prices
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper discusses why mergers often reduce profits, but raise share prices. If being an "insider" is better than being an "outsider", firms may merge to pre-empt their partner merging with a rival. The insiders' stock market value is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. These results are derived in an endogenous-merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 262766
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