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| Tekijä: | Puller, S.L. |
| Otsikko: | The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2006 : NOV, VOL. 52:3, p. 690-706 |
| Asiasana: | environmental policy innovation regulations |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article explores the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face. Environmental regulation often seeks to force an industry to develop cleaner tecnology, but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard. This lack of regulatory commitment induce the regulator to lower the standard, and this strategic behaviour lowers welfare. In oligopoly settings, firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals' costs. In equlibrium, the incentive to raise rivals' cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment. |
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