haku: @all stability / yhteensä: 253
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Tekijä: | Bordignon, M. Brusco, S. |
Otsikko: | Optimal secession rules |
Lehti: | European Economic Review
2001 : DEC, VOL. 45:10, p. 1811-1834 |
Asiasana: | |
Vapaa asiasana: | FEDERALISM SECESSION |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | Should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession? Constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down. However, they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long-term stability of the federation and constitutionally defined secession ruled increase the probability of a break-up. |
SCIMA